Influenza aerosols in UK hospitals during the H1N1 (2009) pandemic - the risk of aerosol generation during medical procedures by Thompson, Katy-Anne et al.
Influenza Aerosols in UK Hospitals during the H1N1
(2009) Pandemic – The Risk of Aerosol Generation during
Medical Procedures
Katy-Anne Thompson1*, John V. Pappachan2, Allan M. Bennett1, Himanshu Mittal3, Susan Macken1,
Brian K. Dove4, Jonathan S. Nguyen-Van-Tam5, Vicky R. Copley6, Sarah O’Brien7, Peter Hoffman8,
Simon Parks1, Andrew Bentley9, Barbara Isalska10, Gail Thomson11, on behalf of the EASE Study
Consortium"
1 Biosafety Investigation Unit, Health Protection Agency, Porton Down, Wiltshire, United Kingdom, 2 Paediatric Intensive Care Unit, University Hospital Southampton NHS
Foundation Trust, Southampton, Hampshire, United Kingdom, 3 Biosafety Investigation Unit, Health Protection Agency, Colindale, London, United Kingdom, 4 Influenza
Group, Health Protection Agency, Porton Down, Wiltshire, United Kingdom, 5Health Protection and Influenza Research Group, University of Nottingham, Nottingham,
United Kingdom, 6Microbial Risk Assessment Group, Health Protection Agency, Porton Down, Wiltshire, United Kingdom, 7 Institute of Infection and Global Health,
University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom, 8Antimicrobial Resistance and Healthcare-Associated Reference Unit, Health Protection Agency, Colindale, London,
United Kingdom, 9Acute Intensive Care Unit, University Hospital of South Manchester, Wythenshawe, Manchester, United Kingdom, 10Department of Microbiology,
University Hospital of South Manchester, Wythenshawe, Manchester, United Kingdom, 11Medical Affairs, Health Protection Agency, Porton Down, Wiltshire, United
Kingdom
Abstract
Background: Nosocomial infection of health-care workers (HCWs) during outbreaks of respiratory infections (e.g. Influenza
A H1N1 (2009)) is a significant concern for public health policy makers. World Health Organization (WHO)-defined ‘aerosol
generating procedures’ (AGPs) are thought to increase the risk of aerosol transmission to HCWs, but there are presently
insufficient data to quantify risk accurately or establish a hierarchy of risk-prone procedures.
Methodology/Principal Findings: This study measured the amount of H1N1 (2009) RNA in aerosols in the vicinity of H1N1
positive patients undergoing AGPs to help quantify the potential risk of transmission to HCWs. There were 99 sampling
occasions (windows) producing a total of 198 May stages for analysis in the size ranges 0.86–7.3 mm. Considering stages 2
(4–7.3 mm) and 3 (0.86–4 mm) as comprising one sample, viral RNA was detected in 14 (14.1%) air samples from 10 (25.6%)
patients. Twenty three air samples were collected while potential AGPs were being performed of which 6 (26.1%) contained
viral RNA; in contrast, 76 May samples were collected when no WHO 2009 defined AGP was being performed of which 8
(10.5%) contained viral RNA (unadjusted OR= 2.84 (95% CI 1.11–7.24) adjusted OR= 4.31 (0.83–22.5)).
Conclusions/Significance: With our small sample size we found that AGPs do not significantly increase the probability of
sampling an H1N1 (2009) positive aerosol (OR (95% CI) = 4.31 (0.83–22.5). Although the probability of detecting positive
H1N1 (2009) positive aerosols when performing various AGPs on intensive care patients above the baseline rate (i.e. in the
absence of AGPs) did not reach significance, there was a trend towards hierarchy of AGPs, placing bronchoscopy and
respiratory and airway suctioning above baseline (background) values. Further, larger studies are required but these
preliminary findings may be of benefit to infection control teams.
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Introduction
In 2003, at least 284 healthcare workers (HCWs) were infected
with SARS-Coronavirus during the severe acute respiratory
syndrome epidemic [1]. Nosocomial infection was the primary
accelerator of infection accounting for 72% of cases in Toronto
and 55% of probable cases in Taiwan [2,3]. Aerosol generating
procedures (AGPs) performed on infected patients were implicated
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as the source of outbreaks among Health Care Workers (HCWs),
however no direct evidence for this mode of transmission was
demonstrated. [4].
Several medical procedures have been reported to generate
aerosols and to increase the risk of pathogen transmission [5]. In
response to these concerns the World Health Organization
(WHO) produced guidelines on infection control procedures and
personal protective equipment in 2007, which were refined in
2009 (Table 1) [6,7]. The guidelines incorporated the available
data relating to the infective potential of AGPs but many of the
studies contained methodological flaws that precluded the use of
their conclusions to draw recommendations, and it was accepted
that the level of understanding of the aerobiology of AGPs may
evolve. In particular the risks associated with individual AGPs
have not been quantified nor has a risk hierarchy been established.
Despite their scientific limitations these guidelines have been
used to plan infection control during subsequent pandemics. In
addition, controversy remains about the importance of aerosol
transmission of influenza in the absence of AGPs [8,9,10]. This
ongoing uncertainty was reflected in the diverse approaches
adopted by different countries in relation to the recommendations
for the use of surgical face masks (SFMs) and respirators by HCWs
during the 2009 pandemic [11,12,13].
WHO guidance states that standard and droplet precautions
(i.e. SFMs) should be adopted when working in direct contact with
infected patients and high level respiratory protective equipment
(minimum of an FFP2/N95 class respirator) should be worn only
in the vicinity of infected patients when AGPs are performed [5,6].
As a result, this infection control strategy was adopted in all U.K.
NHS organisations [14].
Infectious pathogens may be contained in aerosols which are
generally recognised to be ,5 mm in aerodynamic diameter,
remain suspended for periods of time and travel significant
distances. Safety in the presence of infectious aerosols requires
respiratory protective equipment (UK standard - FFP3 respirators)
to protect exposed HCWs [14]. During human influenza infection,
virus emission occurs via coughing and sneezing, which produce a
‘respiratory spray’ containing particles in a size continuum from
,1 to .500 mm [15].
The initial outbreak and subsequent worldwide spread of
influenza A (H1N1) 2009 provided an opportunity to perform air
sampling to define the viral RNA copy number, and size of
aerosols that an AGP (defined by WHO) produces and the relative
burden compared to freely respiring patients.
Methods
Objectives
The primary objectives of this study were to:
1) Establish if World Health Organization defined ‘aerosol
generating procedures’ produce infectious aerosols.
2) If detectable clouds are produced then determine infectious
aerosol concentration and particle size.
3) To use this information to inform infection control practice.
Participants
Air was sampled around hospitalised patients with suspected or
proven lower respiratory tract infection located either in pandemic
H1N1 (2009) isolation rooms (single occupancy rooms) or cohort
areas (wards in which numerous patients suspected or confirmed
as being H1N1 positive were placed away from other patients).
Sampling was performed in 5 different hospitals located around
England, U.K. This study was performed from October 2009 to
January 2011. Peak sampling times corresponded to known
periods of heightened H1N1 (2009) activity. Potential recruits were
identified in participating units by local principal investigators who
informed the sampling team. The sampling team was deployed to
units with the highest level of overall activity. Patient inclusion
criteria were defined as new chest X-Ray changes (e.g. consoli-
dation, alveolar infiltrates or atelectasis) in the presence of one or
more of the following: central temperature $38uC (38.5uC in
children) or #36uC, white blood cell count ,4000 cells/mm2 or
.12,000 cells/mm2, positive microbiology or virology from
respiratory secretions and mucopurulent secretions from the
respiratory tract (Figure 1). During air sampling, investigators
recorded any clinical interventions performed, as well as
temperature, relative humidity, time and location of air sample,
activity levels, patient sex, age, diagnostic specimen type, results
and time since admission. Using these data, two consultant
physicians (JP & MB), blinded to the air sampling data and the
H1N1 status of the patients, independently coded interventions as
AGPs if they met 2007 and 2009 WHO definitions (Table 1). Any
disagreements were discussed until a consensus was reached.
Baseline samples were those taken during interventions not
meeting the WHO definitions of an AGP or taken at least 30
minutes after a WHO defined AGP had been completed. All
recruits had at least one baseline sampling event, but incidence of
Table 1. In December 2009 the World Health Organization (WHO) updated its advice on AGPs.
2007 WHO Guidance 2009 WHO Guidance
Intubation, and related procedures (e.g. manual ventilation, suction) Intubation and related procedures, e.g. manual ventilation
Cardiopulmonary resuscitation Cardiopulmonary resuscitation
Bronchoscopy Bronchoscopy
Autopsy/surgery Autopsy procedures
Non-invasive positive pressure ventilation and bilevel positive airway pressure Respiratory and airway suctioning (including tracheostomy care and open
suctioning with invasive ventilation)
High-frequency oscillating ventilation Collection of lower respiratory tract specimens (e.g. bronchial and tracheal
aspirates)
Nebulisation
N.B. Chest physiotherapy is now not considered an AGP but advice states that a surgical mask should be worn by the patient if tolerated and HCWs should wear PPE as
recommended for routine care (i.e. a surgical mask) during the procedure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0056278.t001
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WHO defined AGPs was rarer and investigators attempted to
capture as many of these as possible.
Description of Procedures or Investigations Undertaken
Glass May 3-stage impingers (produced at HPA, Porton Down),
operating at 55 litres per minute and placed at 1 meter height
within 1 meter of the patients head, were used to collect air
samples for a maximum of 40 minutes [16]. Baseline samples were
taken for 10 minutes. Air was collected into 15 mls of sterile,
nuclease free, molecular grade, phosphate buffered saline. The
May 3-stage impinger fractionates air particles into 3 aerodynamic
size ranges, stage 1 collects particles .7.3 mm, stage 2 collects
particles in the range 4–7.3 mm and stage 3 collects particles 0.86–
4 mm. Liquid air samples were transported to the laboratory
frozen on dry ice and stored at 220uC until analysis.
The sampling team and all staff/visitors were wearing FFP3
respirators in cohort areas and isolation rooms during the 2009/
2010 pandemic. In addition, the sampling team, and a proportion
of the staff/visitors were vaccinated against the pandemic strain
and the majority of other patients in the intensive care units were
on closed ventilator circuits. This means that it is unlikely that the
influenza aerosols could have been generated by anyone other
than the patient on whom the AGP was being performed. In the
case of baseline samples there was often some form of non-AGP
classified activity ongoing (e.g. activity associated with chest
physiotherapy or respiratory care), and as such these samples do
Figure 1. The recruitment and data analysis flowchart.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0056278.g001
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not represent ‘control’ samples where no activity was taking place,
they merely represent air samples taken when no activity that
could be defined as an AGP was taking place.
Sample Processing and Analysis Methodology
On arrival at the laboratory samples were stored at 220uC
prior to RNA extraction. Each sample was concentrated into
,500 ml using 30 kD macrosep centrifugal devices (5000 g for 1.5
hours at 4uC). Any viral RNA present within the resulting
concentrate was extracted using the Qiagen QIAamp viral RNA
spin protocol (Qiagen, U.K.) and eluted into 2630 ml volumes of
elution buffer which were subsequently pooled. Samples were
frozen at 220uC and defrosted prior to use in the qRT-PCR
assay.
A pan-influenza A qRT-PCR assay, based on the pan-
influenza segment 7 assay developed by Spackman et al. (2002),
was used to detect the presence of any influenza A RNA within
the samples [17]. The primer, probe concentrations and RNA
template volumes were re-optimised from the conditions
originally described. The hydrolysis probe was also adapted to
use a black hole quencher (BHQ) rather than Carboxytetra-
methylrhodamine (TAMRA) increasing assay sensitivity. A
standard curve was also added to the assay to allow
quantification of influenza RNA within the samples. This was
prepared using 2009 pandemic nH1N1 A/Cal/04/09 influenza
virus. RNA extracted from a live virus preparation was
performed using the QIAamp viral RNA mini kit (Qiagen).
The full-length influenza segment 7 was amplified by RT-PCR
using RT primer Uni12 and PCR primers Bm-M-1and BM-M-
1027 R as described in Hoffman et al. (2001) [17]. The
amplicon was purified from a 1% (w/v) agarose gel using the
QIAquick gel extraction kit (Qiagen), cloned into pCR 2.1
TOPO vector and heat-shocked into E. Coli TOP10 cells, as
described in the TOPO TA cloning kit (Invitrogen), to construct
pCR 2.1 TOPO-CalM. The influenza A/Cal/04/09 segment 7
insert within pCR 2.1 TOPO-CalM was confirmed by
sequencing using M13 forward and reverse priming sites that
flanked the insert (data not shown). The H1N1 A/Cal/04/09
segment 7 sequence was then amplified from pCR2.1 TOPO-
CalM by PCR using primers MCalFwd1 (59-AGCTAGG-
CATGCGCGGCCGCAGCAAAAGCAGGTAG-39) and MCal-
Rev1 (59-AGCTAGGCATGCTAATACGACTCACTATAGGGAG-
TAGAAACAAGGTAGTTTTT-39) which contained a T7
RNA polymerase promoter sequence (highlighted in italics). A
negative sense T7 RNA transcript of the Cal/04/09 M segment
sequence was generated from the PCR amplicon, with the
amplicon subsequently removed by DNase digestion, using the
Megascript T7 kit (Ambion). DNAse digestion of the amplicon
template was confirmed by agarose get electrophoresis. The
RNA transcript was purified using an RNeasy mini kit (Qiagen)
RNA clean-up protocol and the copy number calculated
following determination of the RNA transcript concentration
with a Nanodrop ND100 spectrophotmeter.
All qRT-PCR reactions were performed on 96-well plates using
the superscript III platinum one-step quantitative RT-PCR kit
(Invitrogen) and run on the Applied Biosystems 7900 real-time
PCR system. Each 96-well plate consisted of a standard curve
(prepared from a ten-fold dilution series of the nH1N1 A/Cal/04/
09 M segment RNA transcript in H2O) which also acted as the
assay positive control, a non-template negative control (molecular
grade water) and RNA from processed air samples. All controls
and samples were run in duplicate. qRT-PCR reactions consisted
of 12.5 ml 26Buffer, 1.25 ml M+25 oligo (AGA TGA GTC TTC
TAA CCG AGG TCG) (300 nM final concentration), 1.25 ml M-
125 oligo (TGC AAA AAC ATC TTC AAG TCT CTG)
(300 nM final concentration), 0.5 ml Rox, 0.5 ml Taq/superscript
enyzme, 0.25 ml M+65 probe (FAM-TCA GGC CCC CTC AAA
GCC GA-BHQ) (250 nM final concentration) and 8.75 ml of
either sample RNA, standard curve RNA or negative control
(dH2O) to reach a final volume of 25 ml. The Influenza qRT-PCR
Cycling Conditions were 50uC for 30 minutes, 95uC for 10
minutes, followed by 50 cycles of 95uC for 15 seconds and 60uC
for 60 seconds. The number of virus copies/litre were for each
sample was then determined using the standard curve (R2 values
were typically 0.94).
Ethics
The study was approved by Oxfordshire Local Research Ethics
Committee (REC reference 09/H0604/119) and the requirement
for informed consent was waived. The committee agreed that this
study did not constitute intrusive research because it involved only
the processing of non-identifiable data. The committee felt that the
provisions of the Mental Capacity Act did not apply to this study.
The committee welcomed the statements by the researchers that
they would always seek the views of patients, parents and/or
relatives prior to starting to take air samples and that they would
respond to concerns after the sampling had started. The
committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance
Arrangements for Research Ethics Committees (July 2001) and
complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for
Research Ethics Committees in the U.K.
Statistical Methods
Statistical analysis was performed with Stata software (version
11.0; Stata Corp., College Station, TX, USA). Only patients
confirmed as influenza A H1N1 (2009) RT-PCR positive from
respiratory tract samples were considered in the statistical analysis.
Univariable logistic regression models were used to examine the
relationship between propensity to produce a positive H1N1
aerosol sample and a number of potential risk factors. Wald tests
were used to assess risk factor significance. A sample was
considered to be positive for aerosolised influenza particles if
either or both of May stages 2 and 3 (0.86–7.3 mm) indicated the
presence of H1N1. Copy numbers from stages 2 and 3 were
summed to give a total copy number for the sampling occasion. A
random effect was included in the logistic models at subject level to
account for potential correlation caused by repeated measure-
ments on the same individual. In instances where a positive H1N1
sample was produced, univariable negative binomial regression
models, corrected for sample duration, were used to examine the
relationship between total copy number per litre per minute and
potential risk factors. Only three participants gave more than one
positive H1N1 sample and so a random subject-level effect was not
used in the negative binomial regressions. Instead a robust
standard error was used to adjust for potential correlation in
these models.
Finally, the probability of obtaining a positive sample and the
viral load obtained from positive samples were modelled to rank
the 2007 and 2009 WHO procedure lists and chest physiotherapy
and produce a hierarchy of procedures on the basis of potential
risk. The classical definition of risk as equal to ‘probability times
consequence’ was used and hence multiplied predictions from the
logistic and negative binomial models together in order to obtain a
risk measure which gives the expected value of copy number
(l/min) associated with each procedure.
Influenza and Aerosol Generating Procedures
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Results
A total of 57 patients were studied, however only 39 patients
were later confirmed as influenza A H1N1 (2009) RT-PCR
positive and were included in the statistical analysis.
Table 2 and 3 show the percentage of total RNA found in each
stage of the May impinger (Table 2) and the % of RNA collected
in each stage during each procedure (Table 3). These tables show
that most of the RNA recovered from the baseline samples has
been recovered in the .7.3 mm size range (53.6% of total RNA
and 78.7% of the total RNA recovered from baseline samples). In
contrast, the total amount of RNA recovered from all the
bronchoscopy samples was only 7.1% (confounded by limited
sample size) but 75.1% of this was collected in the stages,7.3 mm.
The situation is similar for respiratory and airway suctioning (3.0%
total RNA of which 77.6% was in the ,7.3 mm size range).
Therefore the results indicate that AGPs as defined by the WHO
2009 definitions tend to produce aerosols of smaller particle sizes
than baseline levels.
Figure 1 shows the patient inclusion process but as this paper is
interested in the ability of AGPs to generate aerosols rather than
respiratory droplets subsequent analysis deals with the results from
the second and third stages (particle sizes 0.86–7.3 mm) of the May
sampler, however full results can be seen as an online supplement.
Tables 4 & 5 show H1N1 patient demographics together with
other characteristics of their samples.
There were 99 sampling occasions (windows) producing a total
of 198 May stages for analysis in the size ranges 0.86–7.3 mm
(Table 6). Forty-six air stage samples were collected while potential
AGPs (according to WHO 2009 definitions – see Table 1) were
being performed of which 9 (19.6%) contained viral RNA; in
contrast, 152 May stage samples were collected when no WHO
2009 defined AGP was being performed of which 12 (7.9%)
contained viral RNA (unadjusted OR=2.84 (95% CI: 1.11–7.24)
adjusted OR=4.31 (0.83–22.5)).
There were 99 May stages for analysis in the .7.3 mm size
range, 23 air stage samples were collected while potential WHO
(2009) AGPs were being performed of which 3 (13.0%) contained
viral RNA; 76 May stage samples were collected when no WHO
(2009) AGP was being performed of which 9 (11.8%) contained
viral RNA. This was not statistically significant (unadjusted
OR=1.06 (0.26–4.29)).
Results from the logistic regressions (Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)
indicate that, after adjustment for repeated measurements, none of
the variables we examined had a significant influence on the
production of an H1N1 positive aerosol (p,0.05) (Table 6). The
value of the estimated odds ratio (OR) for the likelihood of
producing PCR positive air samples in particle sizes ranges 0.86–
7.3 mm in the presence of a WHO (2009) AGP was 4.31 (0.83–
22.5). The categorical variable for WHO (2009) AGP was itself not
significant.
Subject-level random effects obtained from the null logistic
model indicate that one individual in the study has a significantly
higher propensity than average to produce a positive sample, and
that others have a raised propensity. This, coupled with the lack of
significant relationships given in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, suggests
that propensity to produce a positive sample is more related to
unmeasured individual-level attributes than demographic or other
measured characteristics. The variation caused by the unmeasured
attributes is high as the subject-level random effects have wide
confidence intervals. The Variance Partition Coefficient (VPC) for
the null logistic model indicates that only 31% of the total variance
in the propensity to produce a positive sample is due to differences
between individuals, for example in age or hospital location, and
hence 69% is due to differences within individuals, for example,
stage in infection. Unfortunately we do not have enough data to
analyse an individual through time to investigate this further.
Results from the negative binomial regression are also given in
Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. Copy number per litre is significantly
positively associated with cases aged 50–60 years (incident rate
ratio [IRR] 8.85 compared to referent, (95% CI: 4.14–18.9)) and
cases from hospital location no. 2 (IRR 6.21(2.49–15.5)). It is
significantly negatively associated with days since diagnosis (IRR
0.84 (0.79–0.90)); days since last positive sample (IRR 0.84 (0.78–
0.90)); and relative humidity (IRR 0.95 (0.91–0.98)). However,
WHO (2009) AGP categorisation itself was found to have no
association with copy number, suggesting that some AGPs are
associated with high copy numbers and others are associated with
low copy numbers, as revealed by the IRR estimates for the
various WHO (2009) AGP categories. These range from 0.15 to
5.41 (Table 6) but are, however, inconclusive because of the low
numbers in each category. Our analysis of the influences on virus
quantity in an aerosol is likely to be subject to confounding
because of the low number of positive samples, and possible
correlation between risk factors.
When the data are analysed with regard to the WHO (2007)
AGP definitions there was a broad agreement with the results
detailed above (Table 7). We also included procedures relating to
chest physiotherapy in the analysis against AGP (2009) and AGP
(2007) (Tables 8 & 9). The results suggest that chest physiotherapy
is associated with an increased probability of aerosol production if
included in the WHO (2009) AGP model (OR 3.06 (0.28–33.3)),
but that aerosol titre is lower than baseline samples (IRR 0.23
(0.06–0.93)). To further establish the relationship between
different AGPs the data were modelled to determine a hierarchy
of procedures in terms of the potential risk of generating infectious
aerosol (Table 10). We found that whilst most AGPs are associated
with a higher probability of sampling an H1N1 positive aerosol
they are also, with the exception of bronchoscopy, associated with
lower copy numbers (l/min) than background samples and this
lessens their overall risk (Tables 6, 7, 8, 9). Only bronchoscopy and
Table 2. The percentage of total RNA collected in each stage (size range) of the May impinger compared based on the WHO 2009
AGP definitions.
Procedure % RNA collected .7.3 mm % RNA collected 4–7.3 mm % RNA collected 0.86–4 mm
Baseline 53.6 7.6 6.9
Bronchoscopy 7.1 12.9 8.6
Respiratory &Airway Suction 0.7 0.9 1.4
Intubation 0.0 0.3 0.0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0056278.t002
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respiratory/airway suctioning were found to have a risk greater
than that encountered in the baseline (background) samples.
Discussion
Evidence regarding the role of AGPs in the transmission of
influenza in the hospital setting is limited. [5] The results from
Table 2 indicate that smaller particles are preferentially produced
during AGP procedures compared to baseline samples. However
the total level of RNA recovered is higher during baseline samples,
i.e. large particles containing higher quantities of RNA vs smaller
particles containing smaller quantities of RNA. Due to the
limitations of the sampling method it is impossible to quantify
the total number of particles at each particle size – we only have
an indication of the quantity of RNA collected in each particle size
range. One might speculate (as others have done before) that a
dispersed aerosol with a low concentration of influenza containing
small particles might potentially be more of a transmission and
morbidity risk than a few large particles containing significantly
more total influenza. [5,19].
This study detected influenza virus RNA in 14/99 (14.1%) air-
sampling windows in particles 0.86–7.3 mm from 10/39 (25.6%)
patients in broad agreement with reports from different health
care settings [20,21,22,23]. Of particular note is the fact that
19.6% of air specimens taken in the presence of a 2009 defined
AGP (AGP 2009) revealed virus RNA infractions 0.86–7.3 mm,
compared with only 7.9% in non-AGP (2009) settings (unadjusted
OR=2.84 (95% CI: 1.11–7.24) adjusted OR=4.31 (0.83–22.5)).
Data were analysed for the propensity of an air-sampling event
to produce a positive air sample in the 0.86–7.3 mM aerodynamic
size range. None of the variables investigated in this study
significantly increased the probability of obtaining a positive air
sample for either the 2007 or 2009 analysis. However, there will be
variability in the potential for the air sampler to detect positive air
samples due to a number of factors including room ventilations
patterns, the air particles’ initial velocities, temperature, relative
humidity, and distance from source [24]. Even with this significant
level of uncertainty and the low sample number we estimated an
adjusted OR of 4.31 (0.83–22.5) for WHO (2009) AGP vs non
WHO (2009) AGP settings (p = 0.083). Taken together with an
unadjusted OR of 2.84, and in the context of the small study size,
these findings suggest a true effect i.e. that AGPs as currently
defined by 2009 WHO definitions increase the likelihood of
generating infectious aerosols to the extent that this may be
relevant in a clinical setting. However, we have almost certainly
encountered a Type II statistical error due to small numbers.
Further data are therefore required.
Analysis of the specific procedures shows that bronchoscopy is
associated with the greatest probability of aerosol production
(OR=43.8(1.06–1809)), but both intubation and related proce-
dures (OR=2.71 (0.15–49.1)), respiratory/airway suction
(OR=4.11 (0.50–34.0)) and chest physiotherapy (OR=3.06
(0.28–33.3)) also show increased probability, although none of
these results attained statistical significance.
The quantity of viral RNA is known to vary both between
patients and within individual patients during the time-course of
their illness. Patients early in the course of infection excrete higher
titres of virus and thus might generate aerosols containing more
viral RNA. [25] In our study only 31% of the total variance in the
propensity to produce a positive sample is due to differences
between individuals, and 69% is due to differences within
individuals. Unfortunately, we did not have ethical committee
approval to obtain respiratory tract specimens from patients; thus
although we can determine H1N1 diagnostic status from
specimens taken by the attending physician (the basis of
recruitment into this study), we cannot correlate our air sample
findings against patient virus concentrations. Many other studies
have also noted high variability in the number of virus particles
expelled by subjects infected with respiratory pathogens therefore
this work is consistent with previous studies. [22,26,27,28,29].
The influenza RNA loading of a positive air sample is likely to
be influenced by the source of the aerosol (i.e. the patient and the
location within the patient where the aerosol is produced). In a
recent paper by Johnson et al., 2011, it has been suggested that
aerosols of different particle sizes can be produced from different
areas of the respiratory tract when different activities are
performed, such as coughing, breathing and talking [30].
Although not investigated in this study the results suggest that
the aerosols detected in our study could have originated from
different parts of the respiratory tract, which could account for the
wide range of viral titres picked up. If the viral loading differs
along the respiratory tract and between individuals, and the
different procedures have differing abilities to produce an aerosol,
then a wide range of viral titres would be expected. However it is
also true that variability in the data can be caused by differences in
impinger proximity, orientation, directional air flows, human
activity (producing turbulent air conditions) and ventilation levels
between sampling sites.
The results indicate (although small sample size prohibits firm
conclusions) that performance of a bronchoscopy increases the
viral copy number per litre in positive air samples by a factor of
4.37 (CI= 0.60–32.0). Intubation and related procedures and
respiratory/airway suctioning show decreased IRRs (0.12 (0.03–
0.5) and 0.35 (0.07–1.70), respectively). This is the first evidence to
suggest that some AGPs (e.g. bronchoscopy) may confer a greater
risk of transmission to HCWs than others.
In order to further understand the risk hierarchy, titre and
probability of a positive sample have been used to construct a risk
summary stratification table (Table 10). This table has been
Table 3. The % of RNA collected from each procedure in each stage of May sampler.
Procedure
Number of sampling
occasions (number of
patients)
% RNA collected
.7.3 mm
% RNA collected
4–7.3 mm
% RNA collected
0.86–4 mm
Median copy no./l (inter-quartile
range) for samples with at least one
stage with detectable RNA
Baseline 76 (39) 78.7 11.1 10.2 7,913 (2,436–11,613)
Bronchoscopy 3 (3) 24.9 45.2 29.9 148,805 (12,735–284,875)
Respiratory &
Airway Suction
14 (11) 22.4 29.7 47.9 1,852 (1,543–2,7521)
Intubation 5 (4) 0.0 100.0 0.0 2,838 (2,838–2,838)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0056278.t003
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produced simply as a method to summarise the results and
modeled numbers are purely an indication of overall risk.
However, this table shows that when probability of a positive air
sample and the titre of an air sample are used to define risk, only
bronchoscopy and the 2009 defined respiratory/airway suctioning
carry a greater risk than the baseline samples. Positive baseline
samples may be produced from residual aerosols left from previous
AGPs, by some other unknown low level AGP, or by other H1N1
positive individuals coughing and sneezing in cohort areas.
The copy number of influenza virus recovered from a positive
air sample is strongly influenced by hospital location (p,0.001),
age range (p,0.001), day since diagnosis (p,0.001), days since last
positive diagnostic sample (p,0.001), air sample volume
(p,0.001) and relative humidity (p = 0.006).
Hospital location number 2 had significantly higher viral
concentrations recovered from positive air samples potentially
because this hospital is a tertiary referral centre for respiratory
illnesses which provided extracorporeal membrane oxygenation
(ECMO) for adults during the H1N1 outbreak. In addition, most
bronchoscopies were performed at this location and this hospital
contained the patient with a higher than average propensity to
produce a positive sample.
Age was shown to have a significant effect with patients aged
between 50–60 years having the highest rate of H1N1 aerosol
generation in contrast to what would be expected from previous
studies [31,32]. This apparent age-related effect could be due to an
outlying result; the patient with the significantly higher propensity
than average to produce a positive air sample was in this group. A
negative association between the copy number recovered and the
number of days between diagnosis and sampling was found as
would be expected. The significance of the relationship between
high relative humidity and lower recovery of viral RNA correlated
with previous studies [33].
Limitations
This study has several limitations. Firstly, we did not perform a
biological assay to quantify the viability and infectious potential of
this viral material. Although the influenza virus is capable of
surviving in air in the indoor environment there are no data
regarding the stability of pandemic H1N1 (2009) in aerosols. The
successful culture of viable viruses from environmental samples is
technically difficult and thus relatively insensitive as a bioassay of
infectivity [21,22]. However, we believe that the detection of virus
RNA in an aerosol within seconds of its generation, favours it
being derived from viable viruses.
Secondly, even if an aerosol of the appropriate concentration
does reach a health care worker and is inhaled, inhalation does not
necessarily equate to infection. Infection depends upon infectious
dose, route of inhalation (nose or mouth), tidal volume, breathing
rate, timing and underlying susceptibility (immune status) [34]. It
also depends upon particle size, for a particle to enter the distal
lung it needs to be ,5 mm for .10% deposition [35]. As we
sampled in a wide range of different hospitals and it was very
difficult to establish and get information about ventilation rates
and patterns between hospitals and within different areas of the
same hospital. In general isolation rooms had higher ventilation
rates than ward cohort areas and in some cohort areas the opening
of windows was the only form of ventilation evident. Obviously it
was impossible to investigate fully all the areas we sampled due to
time and logistical constraints in these busy environments. This
study, therefore, can only give an indication of the levels of
influenza RNA which a health-care worker could be exposed to.
Thirdly, estimating the aerosol infectious dose from previous
studies is difficult due to the lack of studies in this area for health
and ethical reasons [19,36]. However, Alford et al., (1967) found
that the aerosol infectious dose of influenza A2/Bethesda/10/63
was between 0.6–3 TCID50, which equates roughly to 0.6–3 virus
particles according to Teunis et al., (2010). [19,37] The potential
Table 10. Risk summary stratification table.
AGP definition
Sample size
(number of
repeats)
Number of
H1N1 positive
samples
Modelled probability of
sampling H1N1 positive
aerosol (assumes subject
effect =0)a
Modelled copy
number (litres/min)b
Risk (defined as expected value
of copy number, equal to
modelled probability * modelled
copy number)
Bronchoscopy (2009) 3 2 0.684 9,986 6,829
Bronchoscopy (2007) 3 2 0.659 9,986 6,579
Respiratory/airway suctioning (2009) 14 3 0.169 800 135
Baseline(2007) 48 4 0.044 3,003 132
Baseline (2009) 66 6 0.047 2,285 108
Non invasive ventilation (2007) 11 2 0.119 849 101
Nebulisation (2007) 3 2 0.691 126 87
Chest physiotherapy (2007) 8 1 0.082 996 82
Intubation (2007) 20 3 0.097 833 81
Chest physiotherapy (2009) 10 2 0.131 532 70
Intubation (2009) 5 1 0.118 284 33
Lower respiratory tract specimen
(2009)
1 0 0.000 0 0
High frequency oscillatory ventilation
(2007)
6 0 0.000 0 0
aProbabilities obtained from univariable logistic regression models examining potential risk factors for production of H1N1 positive aerosol. Sample considered positive
if aerosol ,7.3 mm indicated the presence of H1N1. Estimates adjusted for repeated measurements.
bEstimates obtained from univariable negative binomial regression models examining potential risk factors for copy number per litre per minute given H1N1 positive
aerosol.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0056278.t010
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exposure of HCW during AGPs can be roughly calculated using
the aerosol concentration, breathing rate and exposure time. If we
assume a female HCW breathing rate of 15 l/min during an AGP
lasting 15 minutes then 225 litres of air will be inhaled during the
procedure. [38] The modelled concentration of viral copy
numbers found during the bronchoscopy positive air samples
was 9,986 copies/litre/minute, suggesting that expected exposure
would be 2246850 virus copies. This exposure is significantly
greater than the 0.6–3 TCID50 aerosol infectious dose reported by
Alford et al., in (1967). The study also shows that significant
exposure to H1N1 aerosols (modelled copy number 2,285 copies/
litre/minute) occurs in the absence of a recognized AGP in the
vicinity. This study and that of Killingley et al., suggest that
exposure to aerosols of influenza may regularly occur during
epidemics not just in ICUs or hospitals but in many other
environments [20].
Fourthly, the May impinger does not collect particles ,0.86 mm
aerodynamic particle size, several studies have reported finding
influenza RNA in air particles ,1 mm, thus it is possible that some
of the aerosolized RNA was missed [22,23].
Finally, this was a large and complex study involving
collaborations between the laboratory, sampling teams and busy
clinicians from five hospitals. Due to the limited resources, lack of
time and ethical constraints full clinical information on patients
was not available. It is likely that the patients will represent a full
spectrum of clinical presentations. Some patients would be in the
early course of the infection while others had been infected for
weeks, therefore, no information on viral load immediately prior to
air sampling was available. In addition, there are numerous
technical difficulties associated with the recovery of influenza from
the air with the potential that many additional positive air samples
have been missed due to the reasons previously discussed.
Notwithstanding the constraints imposed by small numbers, our
data indicate that some AGPs as defined by WHO in 2009 do
appear to be related to an increased likelihood of viral aerosol
generation. The data are particularly clear for bronchoscopy and
respiratory/airway suctioning. We conclude that AGPs have the
potential to pose a threat of infection transmission to health care
workers and that until further data are available, UK and WHO
infection control policies for the use of high-filtration face pieces
(respectively FFP3 and N95 respirators) during the performance of
AGPs remain appropriate and should continue to be practiced
according to local guidelines until more data are available.
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